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I. Introduction
With well over a billion websites in existence, finding the
desired material on the Internet can be a challenge.2 Many
individuals, businesses, and organizations are faced with the
similar challenge of ensuring that their websites can be found by
interested parties. Because websites are often the primary
economic livelihood for individuals and businesses, the ease with
which a website can be found is critical.3 Website designers,
2 Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic Billboards Along the Information
Superhighway: Liability Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarks to Key
Internet Banner Ads, 41 B.C. L. REv. 847, 848 n.2 (2000).
3 See William Romanos, Internet Accuracy Wars: How Trademarks Used in
Deceptive Metatagging Should be Dealt with to Increase Economic Efficiency, 7
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 79, 80-81 (1998).
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businesses, and advertisers have, therefore, gone to great lengths to
ensure that their websites can be easily found by Internet search
engines.4 Some website designers and businesses, however, have
run afoul of intellectual property laws in their efforts to ensure that
consumers can find their websites.
This article will examine the implications of the use of a
competitor's trademark as a website metatag or trigger
advertisement. Part II will discuss the technological background of
metatags and will examine the various contexts in which metatags
and trigger ads have been used. Part III will discuss the
relationship between trademark law and metatags and will examine
the ways in which courts have treated metatag and trigger ad cases,
particularly in the application of the fair use defense. Part IV will
seek to draw an articulable legal distinction between which uses of
a competitor's trademark as a metatag or trigger ad should be
infringement and which uses of a competitor's trademark as a
metatag or trigger ad should be fair use. This article will attempt
to reconcile the inconsistency among various courts 5 and will
argue that the use of a competitor's trademark as a metatag or
trigger ad should not be fair use where the defendant's intent is to
4 See generally J. DIANNE BRINsoN & MARK F. RADCLIFFE, INTERNET LAW AND
BusINEss HANDBOOK, 383-91 (2000) (hereinafter BRINSON & RADCLIFFE).
Internet advertising expenditures exceed two billion dollars per year; this figure
is expected to exceed 15 billion dollars per year by 2003. Galbraith, supra note
2, at 849.
5 See generally Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), affirmed by 202
F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Fragrance Counter, Inc., No.
99-0382, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1999); Niton Corp.
v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
usurp the plaintiff's goodwill or to deceive consumers as to source
or sponsorship.
II. Technology Overview
A. Metatag Primer
Before examining the legal implications of metatags, it is
first necessary to understand the technological background of
metatags. Websites are created and designed by using hypertext
markup language ("HTML") code, which instructs a web browser
- such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator - how
to display the particular website.6 In the most general sense,
metatags comprise part of a website's HTML code.7 Although
metatags are not visible to a web surfer while viewing the actual
website, metatags are inserted in the HTML source code for the
sole purpose of being detected by Internet search engines.' When
a web surfer uses an Internet search engine to search for particular
content on the Internet, the search engine uses a website's metatags
to classify and index it among other websites.
9
Although there are numerous types of metatags, the type of
metatag most relevant to trademark law and to the focus of this
6 See Brian Kennan, Diverting Traffic on the Web, 1999 INTERNET LAW &
REGULATION SPECIAL REPORT 1, 2-3 (1999); see also Dan McCuaig, Halve the
Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of Trademarks as Metatags, 18
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643, 646 n.5 (2000).
7 BRINSON & RADCLIFFE, supra note 4, at 387.
8 McCuaig, supra note 6, at 646. A particular website's metatags can be viewed,
however, by looking at the particular website's source code, which is the code
that instructs the web browser how to display the website. See id.
9 Romanos, supra note 3, at 80.
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article is a keyword metatag.10 A keyword metatag, which is
embedded in the HTML source code, serves as a means by which a
search engine can determine the contents of the website. 11 Web
designers typically insert keywords in the HTML code that relate
to the content of the website with the hopes that web surfers will
use these particular keywords when searching for websites
containing particular content. 12 For example, a website devoted to
the appreciation of French Impressionist art would presumably
contain some of the following metatags arranged in HTML code:
<META NAME = "KEYWORDS"
CONTENT = "IMPRESSIONISM,
IMPRESSIONIST, FRENCH, FRANCE,
MONET, WATER LILIES, MANET,
RENOIR, DEGAS, CEZANNE, GIVERNY,
FLANEUR">
Thus, if a web surfer is searching for websites devoted to
French Impressionist art appreciation and enters several of the
above-mentioned keyword metatags in a search engine, the search
engine would return the link to the above website. The more
keyword metatags that correspond to the web surfer's search terms,
the greater the likelihood that a particular website will appear at or
10 Brian J. Gaffhey, Metatags and Keying: Is Their Use Trademark
Infringement?, 2000 COMPUTER L. J., available at
http://raven.cc.ukans.edu/--cybermom/CLJ/gaffney/gaffney.html (last visited
Oct. 21,2001). A descriptive metatag, for example, which is not written in
HTML code, provides the web surfer with a summary of the particular website.
Id.
' McCuaig, supra note 6, at 646.
12 See id.
near the top of the results list. 13 Additionally, some website
developers insert the same word multiple times in its metatag list,
so that a link to a website will appear higher on the search engine's
results list.1
4
B. Keyword Metatags and Keyword Trigger Ads
A problem arises, however, when a web designer uses a
competitor's trademark as a keyword metatag. Website designers
and businesses have used their competitors' trademarks as
keyword metatags and trigger ads in several contexts.
1 5
In some cases, businesses have used their competitors'
trademarks as keyword metatags for purposes of luring web
browsers to their own website rather than to their competitor's
website. 16 For example, suppose that ABC Corporation
manufactures and sells athletic shoes, including its famous
"Spyder" shoes. Suppose further than XYZ Corporation, a direct
13 See id.
14 Ian C. Ballon, Using Trademarks to Drive Traffic to Websites and Other E-
Commerce Law Issues, 590 PRAc. L. INST./PAT 111, 189 (2000). Because over
one billion websites exist today, a web surfer could potentially receive hundreds
of website links after entering common keywords in an Internet search engine.
See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 848 n.2. A web designer, therefore, has an
incentive to attempt to make his particular website appear at or near the top of a
search engine's results lists. Because search engines often classify and organize
search results by relevance, a web designer might insert a keyword multiple
times to increase the relevance of the web site in the results page and, therefore,
make it seem more relevant to the web surfer. See McCuaig, supra note 6, at
646.
15 See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
16 See generally Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring
Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
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competitor of ABC Corporation, also manufactures and sells
athletic shoes. In order to lure potential web surfers and customers
to XYZ Corporation's website, XYZ Corporation uses the terms
"ABC" and "Spyder" in its keyword metatags. This is known
colloquially as deceptive keyword metatagging.
17
A slightly different, but related use of keyword metatags
occurs when a third party website designer uses a competitor's
trademarks as keyword metatags, but the business or entity
contracting with the third party website designer does not authorize
or have knowledge of the use of the competitor's metatags on its
website. 18 Because no court has been confronted with this issue, it
is unclear whether and to what extent this type of unintentional
metatagging will result in liability.
A third and related issue involves an advertising practice
commonly referred to as "triggering" or "keying." 19 Although
trigger ads differ from metatags with respect to the underlying
technology, trigger ads and metatags are analogous in purpose and
effect, as a particular keyword interacts with the search engine's
source code in both contexts.
20
17 See generally Shelby Clark, Note, What a Tangled Web We Weave, When
First We Practice to Deceive: Frames, Hyperlinks, Metatags, and Unfair
Competition on the World Wide Web, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 1333 (1999).
18 See Philip D. Porter, The Nuts and Bolts of Web Site Contracts, 16 COMPUTER
LAW. 31 (1999) (discussing the legal issues raised by contracts and licensing
agreements for the creation and design of web sites).
19See Robert C. Sheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Using Others' Trademarks to
Trigger InternetAdvertisements, 55 N.Y. L.J. 221 (1999).20 Parker H. Bagley & Paul D. Ackerman, Trigger Happy: The Latest Internet
Assault on Trademark Rights, 16 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 2 (1999). The only
technological distinction between metatags and triggering is that keyword
metatags are embedded in a particular website's source code in order to be
found by search engines. Trigger ads contain keywords embedded in the search
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
Triggering occurs when a search engine sells keywords to
an advertiser, so that after a web surfer enters those particular
keywords in a search engine, advertising banners or pop-up
advertisements appear along with the list of search results. 1 For
example, a photography company might buy the word "film" from
a search engine. Each time a web surfer enters the word "film"
into the search engine, the photography company's advertising
banner or pop-up advertisement would appear. Moreover, if the
web surfer clicks on the banner or pop-up ad, she would be
transported to the photography company's website.
The problem arises, however, when a search engine sells a
competitor's trademark as a banner or pop-up ad.22 For example,
suppose that instead of the above-mentioned photography
company buying the word "film," it bought the words "Kodak"
and "Fuji." After a web surfer enters the keywords "Kodak" and
"Fuji," the search engine would presumably list the official
websites of Kodak and Fuji at or near the top of the results page.
engine's source code, which correspond with the actual search terms entered
into the search engine. See id.
21 See Erik Anderson, Protection of Trademarks from Use in Internet
Advertising Banner Triggers: Playboy v. Netscape, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 469
(2000); Galbraith, supra note 2; Scott Shipman, Comment, Trademark and
Unfair Competition in Cyber-space: Can These Laws Deter "Baiting" Practices
on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 245, 265 (1998). Internet search
engines and businesses commonly sell banner advertisements, which appear on
their websites in conspicuous areas. "Pop-up" advertisements are mini-websites
that open and display advertising content while a web suffer is viewing the
larger and primary website.22 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), affirmed by 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); Estee Lauder,
Inc. v. The Fragrance Counter, Inc., No. 99-0382, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1999).
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What if, however, the competing photography company designed a
banner ad to appear above the Kodak and Fuji links and to display
a "click here for free film" banner? As previously noted, clicking
on the banner would transport the web surfer to the competing
photography company's website.
When a business or advertiser uses a generic keyword in its
keyword metatags or trigger ads, common sense dictates that this
practice does not implicate trademark or unfair competition laws.23
The problem arises, however, when a business or advertiser uses a
competitor's trademark as a keyword metatag in its website or
buys a competitor's trademark to use as a keyword to trigger an
advertising banner or pop-up advertisement after a web surfer
enters the competitor's trademark into a search engine. This raises
the question of whether and to what extent trademark and unfair
competition laws affect these practices.
III. Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
A trademark "is a symbol that allows a consumer to
identify the source or sponsor of a particular good or service. 24
The underlying policy of trademark law is to avoid consumer
confusion as to the source or sponsorship of goods or services.25
The law of unfair competition has a similar underlying policy, as it
23 For example, if a pet supply company used the term "dog food" as a keyword
metatag in its website or as a keyword to trigger an advertising banner or pop-up
advertisement, it is clear that this does not offend trademark or unfair
competition laws.24 McCuaig, supra note 6, at 647. See also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.03 (4th ed.). A trademark "is
a designation used 'to identify and distinguish' the goods of a person." Id. §
3.01 (quoting Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996)).2 1 Id. § 2.01.
NT .
seeks to protect consumers from deceit and confusion of source.26
There are several causes of action available to a trademark owner
against one who deceptively uses the mark as a metatag or trigger
ad.
A. Trademark Infringement
Section 43 of the Lanham Act prohibits trademark
infringement. To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant's use of the plaintiff s mark
is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" 
28
the relevant consumer base.29
26 See BEVERLY W. PATrISHALL ET. AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, 1-6 (2000).
27 Section 43 of The Lanham Act provides that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
28 Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (providing the test for
infringement of a federally registered trademark). If the mark is not federally
registered, the test is whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark "is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association" of the defendant with the holder of the unregistered
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B. Dilution
Even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion, the
Lanham Act protects well-recognized and famous marks from
dilution, which is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark"
by a subsequent user of the mark.3 ° Moreover, courts have
recognized that dilution can occur through "blurring,"
31
"tarnishment, 3 2 or "elimination.
33
trademark. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); see also
McCuaig, supra note 6, at 649.29 In order to determine whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark is
likely to cause confusion among the relevant consumer base, courts weigh the
eight Polaroid factors: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity
between the two marks; (3) the proximity and marketing channels of products;
(4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion;
(6) the defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of the
defendant's product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers. See Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 820 (1961); see also Veronica Tucci, The Case of the Invisible Infringer:
Metatags, Trademark Infringement and False Designation of Origin, 5 J. TECH.
L. & POL'Y 2, 28 n.54 (2000).3 0 See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Professor McCarthy notes
that "the dilution doctrine ... [prevents the] gradual attenuation or whittling
away of the value of a trademark, resulting from use by another, [which]
constitutes an invasion of the senior user's property right in its mark and gives
rise to an independent commercial tort." MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.70.
31 Blurring is based on the notion that if consumers observe a famous mark
being used to identify unrelated goods or services, the "unique and distinctive
significance of the mark to identify and distinguish one source may be diluted
and weakened." MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.68. See also McCuaig, supra
note 6, at 651.32 Tamishment occurs when an unauthorized person or entity uses a famous
mark in a manner that degrades or demeans the acquired distinctiveness of the
famous mark. See generally Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp.,
811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that tarnishment occurs when an
C. False Designation of Origin
Additionally, the Lanham Act prohibits the use of "any
word, term, [or] name ... [that] is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection or
association." In order to prevail on a false designation of origin
claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant's use of the plaintiff s
mark is likely to cause consumers to believe that the defendant's
goods or services are sponsored by or affiliated with the plaintiff s
goods or services. 4
D. Initial Interest Confusion
The Lanham Act's underlying policy of preventing
consumer confusion is not limited merely to confusion at the
"point of sale." 35 On the contrary, trademark liability "can be
based upon confusion that creates initial customer interest.,
36
Even if a customer would eventually realize that the defendant's
mark is not affiliated or associated with the plaintiff in any manner,
unauthorized user "corrodes the senior user's interest in the trademark ... by
damaging positive associations that have attached to it").
33 Elimination occurs when an unauthorized user eliminates a channel in which
the trademark owner can use the mark. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998). This case arose in the context of cybersquatting, as the defendant
registered the plaintiffs trademark as a domain name, which eliminated the
trademark owner's ability to use its trademark as an internet domain name. Id.;
see also McCuaig, supra note 6, at 652. It is significant to note, however, that
dilution by elimination only appears to apply in the context of cybersquatting.
Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1304.34 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.8; see also Tucci, supra note 29, at 29-30.
35 See, e.g., Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Mich. 1994); see also Tucci, supra note 29, at 31-32.36 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.6.
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the initial interest confusion is sufficient to establish
infringement.37
E. Defenses
In addition to the above-mentioned causes of action,, the
Lanham Act provides an exhaustive list of affirmative defenses
that a defendant may raise.38 For purposes of this article, the most
relevant defense is fair use.39 The fair use defense ordinarily
comes into play under two circumstances: (1) when a trademark is
being used for a non-trademark function,4 ° or (2) when the
defendant's use of the trademark is necessary to accurately
describe the trademark owner's goods or services.
4 1
IV. Metatags, Trigger Ads, and Trademark Law
Because the above-mentioned doctrines have traditionally
been applied to visible marks, courts have struggled to apply these
37 See Blockbuster, 869 F. Supp. at 513.38 See Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000).39 See 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2000).
40 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). For example, a defendant might assert that the
trademark owner is using the mark for a non-trademark function, such as a
purely functional use. See Sega Enters. Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a purely functional feature is not entitled to
trademark protection). Note that the fair use defense in this context is related to
the doctrine of functionality, which prohibits trademark protection if "the
trademark serves some [purely] utilitarian, non-source-identifying purpose."
McCuaig, supra note 6, at 654.
41 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)
(applying the doctrine of non-trademark use to conclude that it is permissible to
use a trademark owner's mark, even in commerce or advertising, to accurately
refer to the trademark owner's product); see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL,
SoFTwARE AND INTERNET LAW 462 (2000).
doctrines to marks hidden in HTML source code. 42 The question
becomes: how can confusion exist if the consumers cannot see the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark? This article seeks to
answer the question of whether and to what extent the fair use
doctrine should be adapted to comport with this dilemma.
A. Case Law
Although the cases involving metatags and trigger ads are
relatively few in number, a consistent pattern of holdings has
emerged.43 Because the use of a trademark owner's mark as a
metatag differs to some extent from the use of a trademark owner's
mark as a keyword trigger ad, the cases will be discussed
separately.
1. Metatag Cases
Courts have consistently held that trademark law prohibits
a website owner from using a competitor's trademark as a keyword
metatag.44 These cases stand for the proposition that a website
42 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
43 See McCuaig, supra note 6, at 654.
44 BRINsON & RADCLIFFE, supra note 4, at 387; see also Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1043
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark as a
metatag would produce initial interest confusion); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (permanent injunction ordered against
defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark as a metatag); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Asia Focus Int'l. Inc., 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (holding that
the defendant's use of the plaintiff s trademark as a metatag is prohibited by
trademark law); Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-Z-1592,
1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18359 (D. Col. Feb. 6, 1998) (permanent injunction
ordered against defendant's use of plaintiff's law firm name in defendant's
website metatags); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F.
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owner who intentionally or purposely uses a competitor's
trademark as a keyword metatag for purposes of deceiving web
surfers into believing that the defendant's website is sponsored by
or affiliated with the plaintiff will be enjoined from using the
plaintiff's trademark as a keyword metatag.45 Moreover, it appears
that either intent to deceive or bad faith46 is required in order for an
injunction to be imposed.a7 It is significant to note, however, that
although plaintiffs in the various metatag cases have asserted
numerous trademark and unfair competition causes of action,
Supp. 2d. 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (injunction granted to prevent defendant
from using plaintiffs trademark as a metatag); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin
Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (temporary restraining
order issued to bar defendant from using plaintiff's trademark as a keyword
metatag), 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (preliminary injunction granted to
bar defendant from using plaintiff's trademark as a keyword metatag), 1999 WL
329058 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (plaintiff prevailed on motion for summary judgment).
But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark as a metatag to
describe herself was fair use).45 See, e.g., SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(finding bad faith and intent to deceive); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asia Focus
Int'l. Inc., 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (holding that the
"defendants ... purposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract consumers to
their web site under the guise that their sites are sponsored by or somehow
affiliated with" the plaintiff); see also McCuaig, supra note 6, at 657.
46 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (listing the Polaroid factors, which
include bad faith).47 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. It is significant to note, however,
that intent to deceive or bad faith could be inferred by the plaintiff's trademark
appearing in the defendant's metatags. See id. This raises the question of
whether a website owner could escape liability by negating the bad faith or
intent element. For example, suppose that a website designer inserted a
competitor's trademark as a metatag, but the website owner was unaware of the
existence of the competitor's trademark in its metatags.
courts have declined to "specifically and comprehensively
address" the precise trademark implications of keyword
metatags.
48
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp., the Ninth Circuit went further than any
previous court considering a metatag case by extensively
discussing the trademark implications raised by the use of a
competitor's trademark as a keyword metatag. 49 In Brookfield, the
defendant, West Coast Video, was using Brookfield's "moviebuff'
trademark as a keyword metatag in its website.50 The court
conceded that because West Coast's website prominently displays
its own name, it is unlikely that a consumer would be confused as
to whether West Coast is affiliated with Brookfield. 1
Nevertheless, the court held that the act of purposefully creating
"initial interest confusion" or pre-sale confusion - even if no actual
sale occurs as a result of the confusion - is sufficient to establish
trademark infringement.52 It is significant to note, however, that
the Brookfield court left unresolved the question of whether and to
48 Stanley U. Paylago, Trademark Infringement, Metatags, and the Initial
Interest Confusion Remedy, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 49, 62 (2000). The plaintiffs
in the above mentioned metatag cases asserted causes of action for trademark
infringement, dilution, false designation of origin, as well as various state law
unfair competition claims. See supra note 44.
49 174 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999).
50 Id. at 1041-42.
51 Id. at 1062.
52 Id.; see also Paylago, supra note 48 (noting that "even if the initial confusion
is dispelled and the misdirected consumers do not make a purchase, the act itself
of purposefully generating pre-sale confusion by attracting or diverting potential
customers by using another's trademark, is sufficient to constitute trademark
infringement").
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what extent the fair use doctrine applies in the context of keyword
metatags 3 The court noted that the defendant was free to use the
plaintiff s trademark for comparative advertising purposes, but the
court did not address the question of whether the defendant could
concurrently use the plaintiffs trademark as a metatag in its
website for purposes of comparative advertising.54
2. Trigger Ad Cases
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications,
Playboy brought suit against Netscape and Excite for selling the
words "playboy" and "playmate" to third parties as trigger ad
banners.55 When a web surfer entered the words "playboy" or
"playmate" in the Netscape or Excite search engines, a banner ad
to a competitor's adult entertainment site would appear at the top
of the results list.56 The court held that "[e]ven if use of the
generic 'playboy' and 'playmate' [words] were construed to be
used [by the defendant as] the trademark terms," this is insufficient
to establish a likelihood of confusion. 57
In Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Fragrance Counter, Inc., Estee
Lauder alleged that Excite sold the terms "Estee Lauder" and other
federally registered marks to a competitor so that the competitor's
ad banner would appear at the top of the search engine's results
page each time a web surfer entered one of Estee Lauder's
" 174 F.3d at 1065-66.
54 Id.; see also Mark Sableman, Business Liabilities on the Internet, 2-12
JOURNAL OF INTERNET LAW 1, 7 (1999).
55 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1999).56 Id. Netscape (which also provides browser software) and Excite provide free
Internet search engines.
57 Id. at 1073-74; see also Galbraith, supra note 2, at 876. Additionally, Playboy
alleged a dilution claim, but the court held that Playboy failed to show any
actual blurring of the marks. 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
trademarks into Excite's search engine. 58 Because The Fragrance
Counter is in no way associated with or authorized to sell Estee
Lauder products, Estee Lauder alleged trademark infringement and
other trademark and unfair competition causes of action.59 The
case settled, however, on August 1, 2000, with Excite agreeing to
remove all of the plaintiff's trademarks from its list of keywords
for sale.6
0
As previously noted, trigger ads and metatags are
technologically distinguishable, but are analogous for trademark
purposes. 61 Although the trigger ad cases provide very little
precedential value, they seem to suggest that some uncertainty
remains as to the extent to which one may use a competitor's
trademark in its Internet HTML code for comparative advertising
purposes.
B. Trademark Fair Use
To date, only one case has dealt with the extent to which
the fair use defense applies to the use of a competitor's trademark
in another's website HTML code. 62 In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Welles, the defendant, Terri Welles, who was Playboy's "Playmate
of the Year for 1981," used Playboy's "playboy" and "playmate"
trademarks in her website metatags.63 The court noted that where a
trademark is used by another to describe "a person, place, or an
attribute of a product ... the 'policies of free competition and free
58No. 99-0382, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1999).
'9 See id.
60 See John F. Delaney & M. Lorrane Ford, The Law of the Internet: A
Summary of U.S. Internet Caselaw and Legal Developments, 631 PRAC. L.
INST./PAT 31, 151 (2001).
61 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
62 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
6 3 Id. at 1071-72.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
FALL 2001] COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING ON THE INTERNET 53
use of language dictate that trademark law cannot forbid the
commercial use of the terms in their descriptive sense."'
64
Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act provides that a
defendant must establish three elements to succeed on a fair use
defense: (1) the defendant is not using the term as a trademark or
service mark; (2) the defendant is using the term "fairly and in
good faith; "and (3) the defendant is using the mark "[o]nly to
describe" its own goods or services. 65 Under factor one, the court
found that there was "no other way" for the defendant to identify
or describe herself "without venturing into absurd descriptive
phrases."66 Under factor two, the court found that the defendant
used the terms "fairly and in good faith" because she undertook
several measures to eliminate any potential confusion as to source
or sponsorship. 67 Under factor three, the court applied the
Sleekcraft factors, 68 and determined that the totality of the
circumstances did not compel a finding of a likelihood of
confusion.69 The court, therefore, granted summary judgment in
64 Id. at 1073 (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 11.45).
65Id. at 1074 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4) (1999)).
66 Id. at 1079.
67 Id. at 1079-80. Specifically, Welles made a good faith effort to avoid
litigation by (1) adding disclaimers to the bottom of her web site, (2) including a
hyperlink to Playboy's website, (3) substituting the visual title of her web site
from "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981" to "Terri Welles, Playmate of the
Year, 1981," (4) removing the digital images of three Playboy magazine covers,
and (5) removing all of Playboy's copyrighted images. Additionally, she did not
use any other Playboy trademarks or trade dress, such as the Playboy font or the
Playboy bunny. Id.
68 The eight Sleekcraft factors are synonymous with the eight Polaroid factors
used by courts to determine whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff s mark
will result in a likelihood of confusion. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text.691Id. at 1081-90.
favor of Welles, holding that her use of Playboy's trademarks in
her website metatags was "nominative" fair use.
70
Welles seems to stand for the proposition that a website
owner may use another's trademark as a keyword metatag if there
is no other way to describe its own goods or services. But this
particular application of the fair use doctrine necessarily leaves
many unanswered questions regarding the extent to which the fair
use defense is available in other descriptive and nominative
contexts involving metatags and trigger ads.
Some commentators have recognized two categories of fair
use: descriptive fair use and nominative fair use.7 1 Descriptive fair
use allows one to use another's trademark to describe the non-
trademark owner's product or service.72 Descriptive fair use would
arise, for example, where ajournalist uses a trademark owner's
mark to describe the particular product.
73
Nominative fair use, which was applied in Welles,74 allows
one to use another's trademark to show the relationship between
70 Id. at 1075 (noting that nominative fair use is only available when the
plaintiffs trademark is "the only word reasonably available to describe a
particular thing").
71 See, e.g., Tucci, supra note 29, at 47-49.
72 Id. at 47; see also Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d
1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1995).73 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Some commentators argue, as a
matter of semantics, that this is not fair use, but merely non-trademark use. See
id.74 See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. It is interesting to note that the Welles
court may have applied the incorrect form of fair use. Because Terri Welles was
using the "playboy" and "playmate" terms to describe herself rather than to
compare or contrast her goods or services to that of Playboy Magazine, the
Welles court could have reached its fair use conclusion by applying the
descriptive fair use doctrine. See id.
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the two products or services. 5 The nominative fair use defense is
ordinarily aplied to situations involving comparative
advertising.
To succeed on a nominative fair use defense, a defendant
must generally prove three elements. First, the defendant may only
use the plaintiffs mark to the extent necessary to identify the
plaintiff's product or service.77 Put differently, the defendant must
show that he is not using the plaintiff's trademark in the trademark
sense.78 Second, the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark must
be the only way for the defendant to describe the plaintiff's goods
or services. 79 In other words, the defendant must show that he is
using the plaintiffs mark in good faith and not for purposes of
usurping the plaintiff's goodwill in the mark.80 Finally, the
defendant may not use the mark in any manner "that suggests that
[the] plaintiff endorses or sponsors [the] defendant's website." 81
75 Tucci, supra note 29, at 48; see also David M. Kelly & Jonathan M.
Gelchinsky, No Fair! Stop Using My Marks: A Look at the Fair Use Defense on
the Internet, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 1999, at 16.76 Tucci, supra note 29, at 48.
77 See id.; see also Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
78 See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. Courts typically consider factors such as
the visual placement, font size, and the prominence of the word. See Engineered
Mechanical Servs. v. Applied Mechanical Tech., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1149, 1158
(M.D. La. 1984).
79 Tucci, supra note 29, at 48; see also Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
80 Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags: An
Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 259 (1998).
81 Tucci, supra note 29, at 48.
Courts apply a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis to
determine whether a defendant comports with the third factor.82
The larger and more significant question, which Welles did
not reach, is the extent to which a website owner may use
another's trademark as a metatag or trigger ad for purposes of
comparative advertising. Although it is well established that a
website owner may not use another's trademark as a keyword
metatag solely for purposes of deceiving consumers 83 and although
it is equally established that one may use another's trademark for
purely descriptive purposes,84 there is a proverbial gray area
emerging between purely deceptive purposes and purely
descriptive purposes in the context of Internet advertising.
V. Establishing the Boundaries of Fair Use
As previously noted, one of the underlying policies of the
fair use defense is to prevent a trademark owner from using the
mark to stifle competition.85 Moreover, courts and commentators
have recognized that the policies of free competition dictate that
one should be permitted to use another's mark (even for
commercial purposes) if the use of the mark is for merely
descriptive purposes. 86 In theory, this suggests that one should be
permitted to use another's trademark for comparative advertising
purposes in the context of metatags and trigger ads.
82 Kuester & Nieves, supra note 80, at 259. Courts perform a likelihood of
confusion analysis by balancing the eight Polaroid factors. See supra note 29
and accompanying text.83 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
85 See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 11.45.
86 See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 24, §
11.45); see also LEMLEY, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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A. Forcing Square Pegs into Round Holes?
Under the current regime of Internet trademark
jurisprudence, a conflict has emerged between the policies
underlying the fair use defense and the practical application of the
fair use doctrine. As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit in
Brookfield held that the act of purposefully creating initial interest
confusion - even if no actual sale results from the confusion - is
sufficient to establish trademark infringement. 87 The problem
arises, however, when a defendant who uses another's trademark
for comparative advertising purposes on both its website and in its
metatags, asserts the three-pronged nominative fair use defense
recognized in Welles.88
For example, suppose that A, an athletic shoe
manufacturer, establishes a website to sell athletic shoes. Suppose
further that A's website provides detailed specification charts that
use his competitor's trademark to accurately describe the
competitor's products for purposes of comparative advertising. It
is well established that A's use of his competitor's trademark on
the specification charts would be nominative fair use because (1)
A is not using his competitor's mark as a trademark; (2) A's use of
the competitor's mark is in good faith and is the only way to
accurately describe the product; and (3) comparative advertising
does not present a likelihood of confusion.89 Suppose, however,
that A inserted his competitor's trademark as a keyword metatag in
his website for purposes of increasing the likelihood that
consumers will be able to find his specification and comparison
87 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999).
88 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
89 See Tucci, supra note 29, at 48; see also Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
chart. The unsettled issue is whether A may use his competitor's
trademark as a metatag for comparative advertising purposes.
The question, therefore, becomes whether A's use of his
competitor's trademark as a keyword metatag for comparative
advertising purposes is fair use. To make this determination,
courts would apply the three-pronged test articulated in Welles.9°
Under the first prong, A must prove that he is not using his
competitor's mark as a trademark and that he is only using the
mark to the extent necessary to identify the plaintiff's mark. This
factor presents some difficulty in its application; while A is not
using his competitor's mark as a trademark in the HTML code, a
court might deem that A's use of the mark as a metatag is not
necessary to identify the plaintiff s products. Thus, it is unclear
whether A could establish the first prong.
Under the second prong, A must prove that his use of the
plaintiff s mark is in good faith and is the only way to describe the
plaintiff s products. A could establish this prong by showing that
his use of the plaintiff s mark as a metatag is in good faith and is
the only way to describe his competitor's product.
The crux of the problem arises, however, under the third
prong. Under this prong, A must show that his use of the
competitor's mark as a metatag does not suggest that the plaintiff
endorses or sponsors A's website. As previously noted, courts
have traditionally analyzed the third prong by employing a
likelihood of confusion analysis.91 Under Brookfield, however,
courts in the Ninth Circuit - and other courts that choose to adopt
this approach - will not analyze the third prong under a traditional
90 See 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
91 Kuester & Nieves, supra note 80, at 259. Courts perform a likelihood of
confusion analysis by balancing the eight Polaroid factors. See supra note 29
and accompanying text.
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likelihood of confusion analysis, but under a likelihood of initial
interest confusion standard.9 Brookfield, therefore, imposes a
harsher and higher standard for metatag defendants than traditional
trademark infringement defendants.
Although the Brookfield court noted that one is free to use
another's trademark for comparative advertising purposes, it did
not address the question of whether one may concurrently use the
plaintiff s trademark as a metatag in its website for purposes of
comparative advertising.93 It is, therefore, unclear whether A
could establish an absence of a likelihood of initial interest
confusion. Thus, it is unclear whether A could establish a
nominative fair use defense for his use of a competitor's mark as a
metatag.
A similar example will suffice to illustrate the difficulty of
applying the Ninth Circuit framework to trigger ad cases. Suppose
that A "buys" a particular keyword - a federally registered
trademark of B (his competitor) - from a search engine, so that an
advertising banner will appear at the top of the results list each
time a web surfer enters the keyword into a search engine.
Suppose further that the banner reads: "Why pay more for B's
shoes when A's shoes are of better quality?" 94 This is clearly
nominative fair use under the traditional fair use analysis, but the
result might change under the initial interest confusion approach to
the third fair use factor.95
These examples illustrate that the traditional test for
nominative fair use is unworkable in the context of metatags and
92 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
93Id. at 1065-66.94 Note that clicking on the banner would transport the web surfer to A's web
site.95See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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trigger ads. Moreover, in the context of comparative advertising,
the Brookfield initial interest confusion approach seems to expand
a trademark owner's rights while it restricts free competition.
B. Proposal
In trademark law, two recurring, underlying policies might
be of value in resolving the fair use dilemma presented in this
article. First, the Lanham Act recognizes that a mark's acquired
goodwill should be protected. 96 Second, and as previously noted,
courts seem to have imposed the requirement that intent to deceive
or bad faith be present in order for a plaintiff to be awarded
injunctive relief or damages in the context of metatags or trigger
ads. 9
7
Because the traditional fair use analysis does not comport
with metatag and trigger ad technologies, 98 a more appropriate test
should focus on the defendant's intent and good faith. That is, this
article proposes that courts should focus on two primary
disjunctive factors. If the plaintiff can show that the defendant is
either (1) using the plaintiff s mark with the intent to usurp the
plaintiff's good will (and lure web surfers to defendant's website
rather than plaintiff s site) or (2) is acting in bad faith by creating
deception as to source or sponsorship, the court should enjoin the
defendant's use of the plaintiff s mark in the defendant's metatags.
Because the proposed test is a factual inquiry into the defendant's
96 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(1) (2000); see also Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
97 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.9 8 See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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intent or bad faith, courts may infer intent or bad faith from the
surrounding facts and circumstances.
99
The proposed test for fair use would, therefore, bar a
defendant from establishing the fair use defense if he uses the
plaintiff's mark (as a keyword metatag or trigger ad) with the
intent to usurp the plaintiff s good will or to create deception as to
source or sponsorship. 00 Because the likelihood of initial interest
confusion approach is problematic, this test would both preserve
the policies of "free competition" and protect a mark from dilution
or infringement.
10 1
VI. Conclusion
In the global Internet market, businesses live and die not
only by sales and advertising revenues, but also by the ease with
which consumers can find their website. 10 2 As a result, it is
axiomatic that courts will continue to be faced with complex
questions regarding the extent to which the fair use defense should
apply to metatag and trigger ad issues. Because trademark law has
traditionally been applied to visible uses of marks, the framework
proposed in this article - to focus on the defendant's intent to
99 See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 258 (5th
Cir. 1997) (inferring bad faith intent to usurp plaintiffs goodwill from the facts
and circumstances of the case).
100 Additionally, this approach would address the issue of unintentional
metatagging. As previously discussed, this occurs when a third party website
designer inserts another's trademark into the website's metatags. The website
owner, however, does not authorize or have knowledge of the use of the
competitor's trademark in its metatags. The above mentioned approach might
serve as a mechanism for website owners to avoid monetary damages, provided
that the trademarks are removed from the website's HTML code.
101 See Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
102 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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deceive or intent to usurp the plaintiffs goodwill - is an attempt to
bridge traditional trademark analysis with contemporary
technology. It is also one step in the process of recognizing that
our intellectual property laws must be adapted and thoughtfully
tailored to comport with new technologies.
